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ABSTRACT:
Experimental studies on willpower confirm the Strength Model of Self-Control, which claims
that willpower depends on limited physiological resources. Exercising willpower depletes these
resources, which impairs further exercises of willpower. This phenomenon is called “egodepletion.” As a result, depleting these resources impairs further exercises of executive control.
My thesis argues that this phenomenon has two important philosophical consequences: First,
ego-depletion provides evidence against the Humean approach to motivation, according to which
people always act according to their strongest desires. Second, people suffering from egodepletion are not fully responsible for failures of self-control.
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1

EGO-DEPLETION AND THE LIMITATIONS OF WILLPOWER

Willpower is something you exercise to stop yourself from doing something you very
much want to do, or to make yourself do something you very much want to avoid doing. As
such, willpower raises some philosophical questions. For instance, can you try not to do
something you want to do more than anything else? Are you morally responsible for doing
something you want to do, even if you tried very hard not to do it? Traditionally, philosophers
attempt to answer such questions with philosophical methods like conceptual analysis,
phenomenology, and philosophical thought-experiments. However, a growing number of
philosophers also rely on empirical data to look for answers to philosophical questions like these.
In this thesis, I rely primarily on this last method in order to address these two philosophical
questions about willpower.
The following chapters discuss the philosophical implications of some experimental
studies on willpower, and what these results suggest about the two philosophical questions just
mentioned. According to the Strength Model of Self-Control, willpower is like a muscle in that
using willpower requires certain physiological resources, which means that exercising willpower
produces a kind of fatigue that temporarily weakens one’s willpower, a phenomenon called “egodepletion” (Baumeister et al. 1998, Baumeister, Vohs, and Tice 2007).
Since the Strength Model implies that willpower has certain limitations, I will argue that
the Strength Model can help answer the two philosophical questions above. In Chapter 2, I argue
against the Humean approach to motivation, according to which we only try to do what we want
to do more than anything else. I argue that this approach predicts that ego-depletion should not
affect certain self-control tasks. However, there are studies which suggest that ego-depletion
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does affect performance on these vary tasks. Therefore, these studies provide evidence against
the Humean approach.
In Chapter 3, I argue that people suffering from ego-depletion are not fully responsible
for failures of self-control. Ego-depletion makes self-control more difficult, and greater
difficulty makes one less responsible. Therefore, ego-depletion makes a person less responsible
for a failure of self-control than she would be if she were not ego-depleted.
Since neither of these conclusions follow if the Strength Model is false, I begin in this
chapter by arguing that the Strength Model is correct about the way depleting certain
physiological resources impairs willpower. First, I discuss evidence for the Strength Model, and
then I argue against alternative explanations of this evidence. Since the Strength Model is a
better explanation for this evidence than any of these alternatives, the Strength Model is probably
correct. Having provided support for the Strength Model, I rely on this model to challenge the
Humean approach to motivation in Chapter 2 and develop an important consideration about
moral responsibility in Chapter 3.

1.1

What are Self-Control and Willpower?

Self-control is often very difficult. Consider the difficulty of not eating something
tempting but unhealthy, not laughing at something funny but inappropriate, exercising or
continuing to work when tired, or doing something unpleasant, uncomfortable, or even
physically painful. Sometimes we successfully resist temptation, stifle laughter, exercise,
continue working, or overcome pain with a kind of mental effort that we call “willpower.”
Sometimes, however, we have failures of self-control in spite of trying to exercise willpower,
which raises the following question: does willpower have limitations? In this chapter, I argue
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that willpower is limited, but first I need to define what I mean by “self-control” and
“willpower.”
Since self-control is something we exercise to prevent ourselves from acting out of
weakness of will, one possible definition of “self-control” is just not acting out of weakness of
will. However, there are two problems with this definition. First, this definition is not helpful
without also defining “weakness of will,” and philosophers do not agree about what weakness of
will is. Since I want the arguments in this thesis to convince people with different conceptions of
weakness of will, I should offer a definition of “self-control” that is independent of any particular
conception of weakness of will.
Second, there is more to self-control than simply not acting out of weakness of will, which
is evident from cases in which a person does not act out of weakness of will without exercising
self-control. Suppose I order a meal that comes with either a Caesar or house salad, and I want
to house salad more than the Caesar salad, so I simply take the house salad without having to do
anything else to prevent myself from taking the Caesar salad. Even if this case is not an example
of any particular conception of weakness of will, it does not seem like a case of self-control.
Self-control would involve doing something more than just taking the house rather than the
Caesar salad. If I am trying to follow a vegan diet, for instance, I might prevent myself from
taking the Caesar salad by trying not to think about it or trying to control how much I want it.
This case seems like an example of self-control because, in order to take the house salad, I do
something to prevent myself from taking the Caesar salad.
Since self-control involves doing something to prevent yourself from doing something
else, perhaps self-control is just what Al Mele calls “resisting” a desire (1990, p. 459).
According to Mele, resisting a desire means attempting to “manipulate [one’s] motivational
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condition, [one’s] environment, or both in such a way as to bring it about that [one] does not act
on the desire being resisted.” However, there are two reasons for why self-control is not limited
to resisting desires.
First, rather than resisting a desire, self-control may involve preventing, suppressing,
producing or sustaining mental states and processes other than desires, like attention, thoughts,
beliefs, and emotions. Focusing attention in spite of distracting stimuli, suppressing thoughts,
avoiding and dismissing beliefs that are intuitive but unjustified, and controlling emotions like
fear, anxiety, and anger all require self-control.
Second, resisting a desire involves preventing an action based on that desire, but selfcontrol may involve preventing a behavior that is not intentional and therefore not an action.
Such behaviors include crying, laughing, coughing, sneezing, and blinking. Preventing yourself
from crying in public when you are upset, laughing at something funny but inappropriate,
coughing during a talk when you have a tickle in your throat, sneezing when you do not have a
tissue, or blinking in response to a camera flash all require self-control.
Self-control, then, involves doing something that affects attention, thoughts, beliefs,
desires, emotions, actions or behavior. However, nearly all of what I do affects my mental states
and behavior in some way or another. For instance, taking the house salad causes me to believe
that I have taken the house salad, but this effect on my beliefs does not make taking the house
salad an act of self-control. Rather, doing something is an instance of self-control only if it
affects my attention, thoughts, beliefs, desires, emotions, actions or behavior in a way that allows
me to accomplish something I am trying to do. Here is my definition of self-control:
Self-Control
A person S exercises self-control by doing φ if and only if S is trying to do ψ, and doing φ
affects S’s attention, thoughts, beliefs, desires, emotions, actions or behavior in a way that
allows S to do ψ.
4
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This definition allows for three kinds of self-control. First, you can exercise self-control
by arranging your environment in certain ways, by putting yourself or yourself in certain
situations and by avoiding certain other situations. Examples of this kind of self-control include
disabling your internet connection to keep yourself from getting distracted while you work,
placing your alarm clock on the other side of the room to help yourself get up in the morning,
and avoiding situations that lead to temptation.
Second, you can perform certain mental exercises that affect your mental state or
behavior in a way that allows to do something or avoid doing something. Examples of these
exercises include imagining something tempting in an unattractive way in order to make yourself
want it less (Mele, 1990, p. 459), counting to ten in your head when you are angry in order to
calm down, or thinking about why you care about your goals when you are trying to get yourself
to do something unpleasant.
Third, sometimes you can exercise self-control even though you do not know of any way
to change your environment or of any mental exercises that would affect your mental state or
behavior in the necessary way. In these situations, sometimes you can exercise self-control just
by trying to alter or sustain your attention, thoughts, beliefs, desires, emotions, actions or
behavior directly with just effort alone. Examples of this kind of self-control include trying to
attend to the person speaking to you rather other conversations nearby, trying not to think while
attempting to meditate or fall asleep, trying not to believe someone is cheating on you when you
feel unjustifiably jealous, trying not to let yourself want something you believe is wrong even to
want, trying not to let yourself feel angry, trying not to eat something that would break your diet,
and trying not to cough during a talk. People often exercise self-control without changing their

5

6

environment or performing mental exercises, and this capacity for altering and sustaining one’s
mental states and behavior is what we commonly call “willpower:”
Willpower
A mental capacity for altering or sustaining attention, thoughts, beliefs, desires, emotions,
actions and behaviors in a way that allows one to accomplish something one is trying to
do.
Willower is a “mental capacity,” because it is a capacity that one can exercise with one’s mind
alone, unlike the capacity for lifting a heavy objects or the capacity for running long distances.
Other mental capacities include visual, auditory, and tactile perception, language acquisition,
comprehension, and production, emotional responses, working memory, thinking, reasoning,
planning, and decision making.
Since willpower is a mental capacity, a natural question is whether willpower has
limitations like other capacities. For instance, my capacity for lifting heavy objects is limited by
how strong my muscles are, my capacity for running long distances is limited by my
cardiovascular endurance, my capacity for working memory is limited by how many chunks of
information it can hold, and my capacity for reasoning is limited by the complexity of the
problems it can solve. In the next two sections, I argue that willpower has similar limitations.

1.2

Evidence for the Strength Model

In the 1990s, scientists began conducting experiments testing the Strength Model of SelfControl, which claims that the mental capacity of willpower has limitations that are similar to
those of a muscle:
The Strength Model
Willpower depends on limited, physiological resources in the following way: (a)
exercising willpower depletes these resources, and (b) depleting these resources impairs
the capacity for willpower, making self-control more difficult.
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In other words, exercising willpower produces a kind of fatigue that temporarily weakens one’s
willpower, just like using a muscle (Baumeister, Heatherton, and Tice 1994, Muraven, Tice, and
Baumeister 1998, and Baumeister et al. 1998, Baumeister, Vohs, and Tice 2007).. This kind of
fatigue is called “ego-depletion:”
Ego-depletion
A state of fatigue in which the physiological resources necessary for willpower are
depleted.
The Strength Model makes several testable predictions about willpower, and scientists
have conducted lots of experiments that test these predictions. This section focuses on what I
think are the three most important predictions of the Strength Model: Fatigue Generality,
Reduced Prefrontal Activity, and the Physical Substance Prediction.
The first prediction is about performance on different tasks:
Fatigue Generality (of Willpower)
Performing one willpower task impairs performance on another willpower task, even if
these tasks have nothing in common other than requiring willpower.
The Strength Model predicts this phenomenon because performing the first task should drain
some limited resource needed for the second task. If every self-control task requires the same
mental capacity of willpower, and exercising willpower always draws from the same “reservoir”
of physiological resources, then the first task should impair performance on the second task even
if these tasks have nothing in common other than requiring willpower.
Lots of studies have tested this prediction and confirmed it. For instance, Baumeister et
al. (1998) conducted a study in which they brought participants into a room filled with the smell
of baking chocolate and presented them with two food options: delicious looking and smelling
chocolate chip cookies on one side of a table, and a bowl of radishes on the other. Experimenters
told participants that this task was part of a study on taste perception. The experimenters
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instructed some participants to eat radishes but not cookies, and other participants to eat cookies
but not radishes. Then experimenters would leave the participant alone with the two food
options to watch the participant from behind a one-way mirror. A third group of participants,
who would serve as a control group, skipped this task altogether, never encountering the table
with the two food options.
Assuming that eating radishes rather than cookies requires willpower while eating
cookies does not, this task should require more effort for the people who ate radishes than for
people in the other two groups. In fact, eating radishes rather than cookies was apparently quite
difficult. While all participants followed the instructions, participants in the radish condition
would often look longingly at the cookies, some even going so far as to smell one of the cookies
before setting it down and having some radishes. On a later questionnaire, participants who ate
radishes rated this task as significantly more difficult than participants who ate cookies.
After the first task, experimenters presented participants in all three conditions with a
difficult geometrical puzzle, which, unknown to participants, was actually unsolvable. To
measure self-control, experimenters recorded how long and how many times participants would
attempt to solve this puzzle before giving up. Perseverance on a frustrating task should require
willpower, so amount of time and number of attempts should reflect the “strength” of people’s
willpower.
On average, the participants who had eaten radishes spent less than half the amount of
time and made less than two-thirds as many attempts at solving the puzzle as participants in the
other two groups, a statistically significant difference. There was no significant difference
between participants who had eaten cookies and those who skipped the first task, which makes
sense because neither of these groups should have exercised willpower before the puzzle task.
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These results suggest that exercising willpower on the first task impairs willpower on the second
task, making perseverance on a frustrating task more difficult. If willpower depends on some
limited physiological resources, then depleting these resources on the taste-testing task would
explain why the participants who ate radishes would quit more easily on the puzzle task.
Someone could argue that the participants who ate radishes gave up more quickly not
because of impaired willpower, but because they resented the experimenter for not letting them
have cookies, and therefore did not want to try as hard on the puzzle task. However, this
explanation does not cover all cases of Fatigue Generality. Some self-control tasks would not
lead participants to resent the experimenter because these tasks do not involve denying
participants something that they want, like cookies. Even though some self-control tasks would
not cause resentment, these tasks still cause participants to perform worse on another self-control
task.
For instance, Muraven, Tice, and Baumeister (1998) asked some participants to suppress
their emotional responses to a disturbing video, and asked others to watch the same video
without trying to suppress their emotional responses. Assuming that suppressing emotional
responses should require more effort than watching the video without suppressing these
emotional responses, participants in the first group should deplete more of the resources upon
which willpower depends than the second group. On the other hand, there is no reason to think
that suppressing emotional responses should cause participants to resent the experimenters in the
same way as not having cookies, because suppressing emotional responses does not involve
denying participants something that they want.
After the video, experimenters measured self-control by asking participants to squeeze a
handgrip exerciser continuously without releasing. Continuing to squeeze should require
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willpower because of the increasingly uncomfortable feeling of muscular fatigue that results
from squeezing without releasing. Sure enough, people who suppressed their emotions on the
video released the handgrip exerciser significantly sooner than people who did not suppress their
emotions, again confirming the Strength Model’s prediction of Fatigue Generality.
There are now an abundance of studies which confirm the phenomenon of Fatigue
Generality, but I should mention one caveat. Many studies also suggest that the effects of egodepletion are not confined to self-control and willpower. According to these studies, willpower
is not the only way to cause ego-depletion or the only mental capacity impaired by egodepletion.
Willpower belongs to a family of mental capacities involving what scientists call
“executive control.” These capacities depend on different parts of prefrontal cortex and share the
following characteristics: First, people can exercise these capacities consciously, so are aware of
and can report what they are doing when they exercise these capacities. Second, people can
exercise these capacities voluntarily, which implies, for instance, that they can exercise these
capacities in response to a verbal request or verbal incentive. Third, exercising these capacities
can be effortful, so exercising these capacities can involve a conscious feeling of effort as well as
physiological indicators of effort such as increased skin conductance responses (Elliot 2003,
Fuster 2008, Norman and Shallice 1980, Jacoby 1991, Naccache et al. 2005). By contrast, nonexecutive mental capacities, like syntactic processing, implicit learning, and emotional
responses, are automatic, involuntary, effortless, and often occur without conscious awareness.
In addition to willpower, mental capacities involving executive control include conscious
reasoning, planning, and decision making (Elliot 2003). Studies suggest that these other
capacities are affected by ego-depletion. For instance, Schmeichel et al. (2003) found that
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exercising willpower on the emotion suppression task impairs performance on a test with
complex problems that require conscious reasoning, but not on a general knowledge and
vocabulary test that requires little conscious reasoning. They asked participants to watch an
excerpt from a documentary with upsetting footage of animal suffering, and told some
participants to suppress emotional responses to the video and other participants to react naturally
to the video.
After the video, participants from both groups took part of the GMAT test, which
includes simple vocabulary and general knowledge questions that require remembering words
and facts, but not very much conscious reasoning. After the GMAT, participants took the CET
test, which consists of 20 difficult questions with unclear answers that require lots of conscious
reasoning to answer accurately. Participants who suppressed their emotional responses while
watching the video performed significantly worse on the CET, but not the GMAT. These results
suggest that suppressing emotional responses impairs conscious reasoning, but not remembering
words and facts, which does not involve much conscious reasoning.
Studies also suggest that exercising these other capacities involving executive control can
also cause ego-depletion. For instance, Vohs, et al. (2008) found that making conscious choices
on one task impairs willpower on a task that requires resisting physical pain. They asked one
group of participants to make a long series of choices between different products, which involves
executive control, and they asked another group of participants, as a control group, to write down
thoughts, feelings, and opinions about a series of advertisements.
To measure self-control, experimenters used the cold pressor task of pain tolerance.
They asked participants to submerge the non-dominant arm up to the elbow in a tank full of
painfully cold, almost freezing water, and hold it there as long as possible. On average,
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participants who made choices between products quit after a little less than half a minute,
whereas other participants quit after just over a minute, a statistically significant difference.
Assuming that holding one’s arm under painfully cold water requires willpower, these results
confirm that making a long series of conscious choices causes ego-depletion and impairs
willpower.
Since studies suggest that Fatigue Generality applies to other capacities involving
executive control as well as willpower, here is a more accurate description of this phenomenon:
Fatigue Generality (of Executive Control)
Performing one executive control task impairs performance on a second executive control
task, even if these tasks have nothing in common other than executive control.
Allowing that the Strength Model applies, not just to willpower, but to all mental capacities
involving executive control, Fatigue Generality is still a prediction of the Strength Model, and
the experimental results discussed so far confirm this prediction.
The second prediction of the Strength Model is the neural correlates of Fatigue
Generality, or what happens in the brain when the first task impairs performance on the second
task:
Reduced Prefrontal Activity
Performing one executive control task should cause reduced activity in the relevant part
of the prefrontal cortex during a second executive control task.
The Strength Model predicts this phenomenon because performing the first task should impair
certain mental capacities on the second task, and these capacities depend on different parts of the
prefrontal cortex. Since exercising these capacities involves activity in these different parts of
the prefrontal cortex, impairments in these capacities should accompany reduced activity in these
areas. Measuring prefrontal activity is a non-behavioral way of measuring performance on the
second task.
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A couple of studies confirm this prediction. Hedgcock, Vohs and Rao (2012) used fMRI
to look at activity in the middle frontal gyrus, part of the prefrontal cortex, while participants
performed the consumer choices task. Before the consumer choices task, participants performed
the attention control task, in which participants watched a silent video of a woman talking while
words appear for brief periods of time in the corner of the screen. Some participants watched the
video while trying not to look at the words, while other participants watched without making any
such effort. Trying not to look at the words should require willpower, while watching the video
without making any such effort should not. Trying not to look at the words during the attention
control task resulted in slower reaction times during the consumer choices task, which confirms
the prediction of Fatigue Generality, as well as reduced activity in the middle frontal gyrus,
which confirms the prediction of Reduced Prefrontal Activity.
Inzlicht and Gutzell (2007) used EEG to look at electrical brain activity in the anterior
cingulate cortex (ACC), another part of the prefrontal cortex, while participants performed the
Stroop task, which requires willpower because people must stop themselves from reading color
words in order to respond to the color in which the word printed. First, participants watched an
upsetting video. Participants who suppressed their emotional responses during the video task
performed worse on the Stroop task, which confirms the prediction of Fatigue Generality, and
ACC activity was weaker during the Stroop task for these participants, which confirms the
prediction of Reduced Prefrontal Activity.
The third prediction of the Strength Model is about the physical substance upon which
executive control depends:
The Physical Substance Prediction
There is some physical substance X that decreases in concentration when performing an
executive control task, and restoring this substance before a second executive control task
prevents impaired performance on this second task.
13
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The Strength Model predicts the existence of substance X because this substance would be the
physiological resource upon which executive control depends. If depletion of this substance
accounts for the effect of one executive control task on another, then this substance must
decrease after the first task, and restoring this substance should eliminate the effect of the first
task on the second.
Some studies suggest that this substance is blood glucose. Gailliot et al. (2007) found
that the attention control task (avoiding looking at words appear during a movie) caused a
significant reduction in the concentration of blood glucose. Experimenters measured blood
glucose before and after the task, and found that blood glucose declined significantly for
participants who tried not to attend to the words, while there was no significant decline for
participants who watched the video without making any effort to avoid attending to the words.
These results suggest that exercising willpower on the attention control task caused a decrease in
blood glucose.
Gailliot et al. (2007) also found that providing participants with glucose can eliminate the
effects of ego-depletion. After performing the attention control task, participants received either
a glass of lemonade sweetened with glucose or with a non-glucose artificial sweetener. Then all
participants performed the Stroop Task.
For participants who drank the non-glucose lemonade, performance was typical of other
studies on willpower: those who exercised willpower on the attention control task performed
worse on the Stroop task than those who did not exercise willpower. For participants who drank
lemonade sweetened with glucose, however, the attention control task had no effect on the
Stroop task. Drinking glucose seems to eliminate the effect of ego-depletion, which suggests
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that ego-depletion involves a lack of blood glucose, confirming the Physical Substance
Prediction.
The experimental results discussed so far support the Strength Model because they
confirm its three most important predictions: Fatigue Generality, Reduced Prefrontal Activity,
and the Physical Substance Prediction. Unless there is some better explanation for these
experimental results, they provide good evidence for the Strength Model. The next section
considers some alternative explanations of these experimental results, but argues against these
alternatives explanations.

1.3

Other Possible Explanations

The studies discussed so far evince the phenomenon of Fatigue Generality: performing
one executive control task results in worse performance on another executive control task. The
Strength Model is committed to a particular explanation of this phenomenon: exercising
executive control produces a kind of fatigue by depleting certain physiological resources, and
this state of fatigue impairs mental capacities involving executive control. Since certain tasks
require these capacities, impairing these capacities makes these tasks more difficult, which is
why people in this state of fatigue perform worse on these tasks.
Notice that a crucial part of the Strength Model’s explanation is that impaired mental
capacities make certain tasks more difficult. This section argues against some alternative
explanations of Fatigue Generality. To distinguish the explanation just given from these
alternative explanations, I call it the “Difficulty Explanation:”
The Difficulty Explanation
People suffering from ego-depletion have impaired mental capacities that make executive
control tasks more difficult.
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This explanation of fatigue generality is plausible because similar explanations apply to other
cases of poor task performance. For example, sleep deprivation makes people worse at certain
tasks like mental arithmetic, and the explanation for this effect is that sleep deprivation impairs
certain mental capacities, which makes certain tasks like mental arithmetic more difficult.
Similarly, the Difficulty Explanation claims that people suffering from ego-depletion quit more
quickly on the cold pressor task, for instance, because ego-depletion impairs willpower, which
makes it more difficult to endure the painfully cold water.
While the Strength Model is committed to the Difficulty Explanation, there are other
explanations of Fatigue Generality that do not involve impaired mental capacities or greater
difficulty of a task. I discuss three of these alternative explanations.
The first of these three explanations is that willpower and other capacities involving
executive control are not actually limited in the way the Strength Model claims, but rather people
believe that willpower and these other capacities are limited in this way. This belief leads them
to perform worse on their second task either because they believe they are not able to perform at
the same level, or because they believe that they need to conserve their willpower. The belief in
limited willpower works as a self-fulfilling prophesy. People believe they must perform worse,
and then they do.
The Belief Explanation
People believe that willpower and other capacities are limited and that these capacities
are impaired from their first task, causing them not to try as hard on other tasks.
This explanation is distinct from the Difficulty Explanation because people might believe in
limited willpower even though willpower is not actually limited, people might not believe in
limited willpower even though their willpower is actually limited. These two possibilities
provide ways of testing the Belief Explanation against the Difficulty Explanation.
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Job, Dweck, and Walton (2010) conducted such a test by using questionnaires designed
to influence one group of participants to believe in limited willpower and another group of
participants to believe in unlimited willpower. Then participants performed one of two versions
of a task, designed to require willpower or not. Finally, all participants performed another task
that requires willpower, and experimenters measured their performance. For participants primed
to believe in limited willpower, exercising willpower on the first task resulted in significantly
worse performance on the second task, just like in most of the studies discussed thus far. For
participants primed to believe in unlimited willpower, exercising willpower on the first task had
a smaller but opposite effect. The participants who exercised willpower on the first task actually
performed slightly better on the second task. These results seem more consistent with the Belief
Explanation than the Difficulty Explanation.
However, perhaps the belief in limited willpower is actually correct, and the belief in
unlimited willpower only reverses the effect of ego-depletion when ego-depletion is mild. In this
case, severe enough ego-depletion might still impair performance even for people who believe in
unlimited willpower.
Vohs, Baumeister, and Schmeichel (2012) produced a conceptual replication of the
results of the previous study, and tested the hypothesis that the belief in unlimited willpower
would not reverse the effects of ego-depletion when ego-depletion is severe enough. They
measured executive control using a delayed gratification task and a logical reasoning task,
preceded by either four, one, or no tasks designed to require executive control.
For participants who believed in limited willpower, performing one or four executive
control tasks prior to the measurement phase of the experiment resulted in worse performance on
the delayed gratification and logical reasoning tasks, as in most of the studies described thus far.
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For participants who believed in unlimited willpower, performing one executive control task
prior to the measurement phase of the experiment did not result in worse performance in delayed
gratification and logical reasoning, a conceptual replication of the previous study.
However, for participants who believed in unlimited willpower, performing four
executive control tasks did result in significantly worse performance on delayed gratification and
logical reasoning, suggesting that this belief does not reverse the effect of ego-depletion when
ego-depletion is severe enough. These results suggest that the belief in limited willpower is
actually correct, and the belief in unlimited willpower only reverses the effect of ego-depletion
when ego-depletion is mild, which is more consistent with the Difficulty Explanation than the
Belief Explanation.
The second alternative explanation of Fatigue Generality is that executive control tasks
have a negative effect on people’s mood, and this negative effect on mood causes people to
perform worse on another executive control task. For instance, previously I considered the
possibility that participants perform worse on the frustrating puzzle because they resent the
experimenter for not allowing them to have any cookies. This resentment involves a negative
mood.
I dismissed this possibility because, in many cases, the first executive control task should
not lead participants to resent the experimenter. Often, this first task does not involve denying
participants something they want.
However, suppose the first executive control task affects performance on the second task,
not because of resentment for not getting something, but simply because participants dislike the
first task or find it unpleasant. In this case, the first executive control task would have a negative
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effect on mood, which might result in worse performance on another executive control task.
Since this explanation is an alternative to the Difficulty Explanation, it also deserves a name:
The Mood Explanation
Performing one executive control task has a negative effect on mood, which causes
people not to try as hard on other tasks.
This explanation is distinct from the Difficulty Explanation because people’s mood could get
worse without impairing any of their mental capacities, and their mental capacities could become
impaired without any change in their mood. These two possibilities provide ways of testing the
Mood Explanation against the Difficulty Explanation.
Researchers have tested this explanation in a couple of ways. In many studies, including
the study with the radishes and cookies, experimenters check for changes in mood using a
questionnaire, such as the Positive Affect Negative Affect Scale (PANAS) or the Brief Mood
Introspection Scale (BMIS), designed to detect differences in mood between different groups of
participants, (Baumeister et al. 1998). For instance, if eating radishes rather than cookies has a
negative effect on mood, then people who ate radishes, on average, should score differently on
these questionnaires than people who ate cookies. In most of these studies, including the study
with the radishes and cookies, people who exercised executive control on their first task did not
score significantly differently from people who did not have to exercise executive control,
suggesting that exercising executive control does not have such a negative effect on mood. If
there is no negative effect on mood, then mood does not explain why people who exercise
executive control on the first task perform worse on the second task.
There are also more direct ways of testing the mood explanation: two of the studies I
mentioned above involve a video task that illicits negative emotions by requiring participants to
watch an upsetting video. A similar task illicits positive emotions by requiring participants to
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watch a funny video. Comparing the effects of these two tasks provides experimenters with a
more direct way of testing for an effect of mood on executive control. In one study, for instance,
experimenters asked some participants to watch a funny video, and other participants to watch a
distressing video. For participants watching both videos, experimenters asked some participants
to suppress emotional responses such as laughter and distress, while other participants received
no such instructions. If negative mood explains why depleted participants perform worse on the
second task, then participants who watched the funny video should perform better than those
who watch the distressing video. However, there was no significant relationship between the
content of the video and performance on the anagram task. Since the content of the video had no
significant effect on task performance, these results suggest that negative mood does not explain
why depleted participants perform worse. These results are not consistent with the Mood
Explanation.
The Difficulty Explanation, on the other hand, predicts that participants who suppress
there emotional responses, positive or negative, will suffer from ego-depletion and perform
worse on the second task. Just as the Difficulty Explanation predicts, people who suppressed
both positive and negative emotional responses performed significantly worse on an anagram
task than people who did not try to suppress their positive or negative emotional responses.
These results confirm the Difficulty Explanation.
Since the Mood Explanation relies on the claim that negative mood reduces motivation to
perform well on the second task, the Mood Explanation is really a special version of a more
general kind of explanation:
The Motivation Only Explanation
Exercising executive control on one task reduces motivation to perform well on a second
executive control task, which causes people not to try as hard on the second task.

20

21

Importantly, the Difficulty and Motivation Only Explanations are quite distinct. Suppose
Charlie, a surly teenager, is getting C’s and D’s in high school pre-calculus. Dad thinks that
Charlie is performing poorly because math is difficult for Charlie. Charlie is just not as good at
math as other kids. Mom thinks Charlie is performing poorly because Charlie does not care
about math and does not want to do better.
Perhaps Mom and Dad are both partially correct about why Charlie is not getting better
grades, but they are not offering the same explanation for his performance. If Mom is correct,
then Charlie’s performance might improve if they offer him incentives to perform better. If Dad
is correct and Mom is completely wrong, then incentives should have no such effect.
If some people perform worse on their second task simply because of a lack of
motivation, then a sufficient increase in their motivation should cause them to perform better. If
so, then offering participants an incentive to perform better might compensate for the effects of
ego-depletion. Muraven and Slessareva (2003) conducted three studies in which they found that
manipulating motivation does influence performance on the second task, in a way that can
compensate for the effects of ego-depletion. They manipulated motivation in different ways for
the three studies: by telling participants that good performance on the second task would provide
valuable information for developing treatments that would benefit people with Alzheimer’s (the
first study), by telling participants that practicing on a task would or would not greatly improve
their skill (the second study), and by offering participants a small or large monetary reward for
task performance (third study). Questionnaires used in the first and third studies confirmed that
these manipulations did affect motivation.
Task performance reflected these differences in reported motivation. In all three studies,
ego-depletion had the usual effect of impairing performance on the second task, but only for
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participants who received the smaller incentive or no incentive at all. For participants who were
offered a large enough incentive, executive control on the first task did not result in significantly
worse performance on the second task. Motivation compensates for the effect of ego-depletion.
Do these results show that differences in motivation account entirely for differences in
performance in all of the studies discussed thus far? Muraven and Slessareva acknowledge that
their results are compatible with a couple of different interpretations. Perhaps ego-depletion
reduces people’s motivation to perform well on the second task, and offering people an incentive
restores this motivation. This interpretation is consistent with the Motivation Only Explanation.
Another interpretation, however, is that ego-depletion impairs mental capacities involving
executive control, making the second task more difficult, and offering people a strong enough
incentive provides them with some extra motivation, causing them to try harder on the second
task, improving their performance in spite of the increased difficulty of this task.
By analogy, consider Charlie’s classmate Rachel, who is getting A’s in pre-calculus.
Perhaps Rachel’s grades are better than Charlie’s because Rachel has more motivation than
Charlie, or perhaps because Rachel is better at math than Charlie, or perhaps both explanations
are partially correct. Suppose Mom offers Charlie an incentive to get an A on his next math test
by threatening to take away his Xbox if he gets anything worse than an A. Charlie finds this
incentive to be highly motivating, studies very hard, and earns an A on the test. One
interpretation of the results of this “experiment” is that Charlie’s grades were worse than
Rachel’s because Charlie had less motivation than Rachel, and that the prospect of having his
Xbox taken away increased his motivation enough to cause him to get an A, perhaps even
enough to have as much motivation as Rachel. Another interpretation, however, is that, while
Rachel and Charlie have equal amounts of motivation, Rachel’s grades are better simply because

22

23

she is better at math. In this case, the prospect of losing his Xbox increases Charlie’s motivation
to a level much greater than Rachel’s, causing him to try much harder (by studying harder)
causing him to perform as well as she does on the exam even though she is better at math than he
is.
One dissimilarity between this example and the studies in Muraven and Slessareva (2003)
is that, in the case of Charlie and Rachel, we can actually determine which interpretation is
correct by comparing how hard Charlie and Rachel try. Charlie tries as hard as Rachel before
receiving an incentive, and tries much harder than her after receiving one, then the second
explanation is probably correct. Rachel’s grades have been better than Charlie’s up until this
point probably because she is better at math than he is, not because she has more motivation.
Otherwise, maybe the first interpretation is correct. We can determine which interpretation is
correct by measuring how hard Charlie tries before and after receiving an incentive, and
comparing both levels of effort to Rachel’s. We can measure both Charlie’s and Rachel’s efforts
by looking at the way they study, and how much time they spend studying. In the studies in
Muraven and Slessareva (2003), there is no analogous way to measure how hard people in
different groups are trying on the second task. All we can measure is their performance on this
task, but differences in performance are what we are trying to explain in the first place. To rely
on task performance as an indicator of how hard people try would beg the question against the
difficulty explanation.
We need some other way of determining which interpretation is correct that does not
require directly measuring effort. Fortunately, there are other differences between these two
interpretations that might suggest a way of testing which is correct. For instance, if worse
performance on the second task is only due to lack of motivation, then providing enough extra
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motivation should always improve performance on this task. However, if worse performance on
the second task is due to an impaired capacity, then providing some extra motivation might or
might not improve performance on the second task by causing a person to try hard enough to
compensate for this impairment.
When the capacity in question is not impaired too severely, perhaps one can compensate
for the impairment by trying hard enough. Sometimes, however, the capacity in question might
be impaired so severely that one cannot compensate for this impairment no matter how hard one
tries. In this case, some extra motivation should not reverse the effects of ego-depletion.
By analogy, suppose Charlie has a severe concussion a few days before his exam,
resulting in brain damage that significantly lowers his IQ. If the loss is severe enough, then he
will not get an A on the test no matter how hard he tries, and threatening to take his Xbox away
will not cause him to get an A.
If exercising executive control depletes a limited resource that makes tasks requiring
executive control more difficult, then perhaps for severe enough cases of ego-depletion some
incentives will not affect performance on the second task. Vohs, Baumeister, and Schmeichel
(2012) produced a conceptual replication of the results of Muraven and Slessareva’s results, and
tested the hypothesis that extra motivation would not compensate for the effects of ego-depletion
when ego-depletion is severe enough.
To obtain varying degrees of ego-depletion, they required some participants to perform
four executive control tasks in a row (severe depletion), some participants to perform one
executive control tasks (mild depletion), and some participants to perform no executive control
tasks. Participants from all three groups would then perform two tasks for measuring delay of
gratification and logical reasoning. Some participants were told that good performance on these
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tasks would provide valuable information that would benefit consumer welfare, happiness, and
health, while other participants were not told about any benefits. To ensure that this
manipulation actually did provide extra motivation, experimenters administered a questionnaire
at the end of the experiment. Participants who were told about the benefits of good performance
reported significantly greater motivation to perform well than participants who were not told
about any benefits. Also, there was no significant relationship between the number of tasks
people performed prior to the measurement phase and reported motivation, suggesting that
performing four tasks, one task, or no tasks before the measurement phase did not affect
motivation.
For participants who did not receive extra motivation, executive control prior to the
measurement phase resulted in significantly worse performance on both the delayed gratification
and logical reasoning tasks, just like in all the studies discussed thus far. For participants who
did receive extra motivation, performing one executive control task prior to the measurement
phrase had no significant effect on delayed gratification and logical reasoning, which suggests
that the extra motivation compensated for the effect of the first task just as Muraven and
Slessareva had found. However, for participants who performed four tasks prior to the
measurement phase, those with some extra motivation did not perform significantly better than
those who did not receive the extra motivation, suggesting that four tasks depleted people
severely enough to make the extra motivation ineffective. Since severe enough ego-depletion
makes extra motivation ineffective, these results suggested that differences in performance on
the delayed gratification and logical reasoning tasks are not entirely due to differences in
motivation. These results are more consistent with the Difficulty Explanation than with the
Motivation Explanation.
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Since some experimental results are not consistent with the Mood, Motivation Only, and
Belief explanations, the Difficulty Explanation is the best explanation for the entire body of
experimental results discussed so far. Exercising executive control depletes some limited
physiological resource, probably blood glucose, and tasks that require executive control are more
difficult when this resource is depleted. People suffering from ego-depletion perform worse on
these tasks because these tasks are more difficult for them, the same way that running several
miles is more difficult for someone suffering from cardiovascular exhaustion. In the next two
chapters, I will argue that this conclusion has some important philosophical consequences for the
relationship between desire and motivation, and also for moral responsibility.
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2

WILLPOWER AND MOTIVATION:

HOW WE DO WHAT WE DON’T WANT TO DO
One project of action theory is to develop a theory of motivation that explains why
people intentionally act one way rather than another. For instance, why does someone go out for
a drink after work rather than going home to grade papers? Philosophers who advocate the
Humean approach to motivation attempt to explain people’s actions entirely in terms of the
strengths of their desires. Someone intentionally goes out for a drink rather than going home
because the desire to go out is stronger than the desire to go home. In other words, we only act
on a desire that is stronger than any conflicting desire. In this chapter, I argue that the Humean
approach makes testable predictions, and that experimental studies on self-control disconfirm
these predictions and provide evidence against the Humean approach.
In Section 2.1, I introduce the Humean approach and explain why this approach has a
strange implication about self-control: Self-control often involves intentionally trying to resist a
desire, but the Humean approach is committed to the claim that we never intentionally try to
resist a desire that is stronger than any conflicting desire. For instance, I will never intentionally
try to resist my desire to stay in bed when this desire is stronger than my desire to get up.
In Section 2.2, I argue that the Humean approach predicts that certain self-control tasks
are exceptions to the phenomenon of Fatigue Generality discussed in the previous chapter.
However, experimental studies find that these tasks are not exceptions to Fatigue Generality.
Since these studies disconfirm the Humean approach’s prediction, they provide evidence against
the Humean approach.
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2.1

The Humean Approach

Hume famously argued that “reason” is the “slave of the passions,” meaning that reason
alone cannot motivate someone to act in a certain way because passions are necessary for
motivation (Hume, Treatise, 2.3.3). In contemporary action theory, Hume’s position on
motivation inspired the “Humean” approach to motivation, according to which beliefs are not
sufficient for the motivation to act in a certain way, because desires are necessary for motivation
(Sinhababu 2009). For instance, every semester I have students who never come to class even
though they know they cannot pass without attending. According to the Humean approach, the
belief that one cannot pass without attending is not sufficient to motivate people to come to class.
A desire, such as the desire to avoid failing, is necessary for motivation.
While philosophers disagree about what desires are, they tend to agree about certain
characteristics of desire. First, desires are mental states, like beliefs and emotions.
Second, desires have content. In other words, like beliefs and perhaps emotions, a desire
is about something. We often say that one has a desire for something, a desire to do something,
or a desire that something happen or that something is the case.
Third, desires motivate. Specifically, desires motivate us to act in ways that we believe
will accomplish what our desires are about. If I have a desire for a margarita that is sufficiently
sour and not too sweet, and I believe mixing one part triple sec, two parts lime juice, and three
parts tequila makes a margarita that is sufficiently sour and not too sweet, then my desire for
such a margarita will motivate me to mix these ingredients together in this way.
Finally, desires are non-truth-apt. In other words, unlike beliefs, desires cannot be true or
false. For beliefs, what a belief is about determines whether that belief is true or false. For
instance, the belief that the earth is flat is false, while the belief that water is H2O is true. For
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desires, on the other hand, what a desire is about determines what that desires motivates a person
to do, but does not make that desire true or false. For instance, my desire for a margarita can
motivate me to do what I believe will make one, but this desire is not true or false.
These for characteristics provide a fairly uncontroversial, working definition for “desire:”
Desire
A non-truth mental state that motivates one to act in a way that one believes will
accomplish what that mental state is about.
The Humean approach is committed to explaining everything people try to do in terms of this
kind of mental state.
Sometimes a desire motivates a person to act in a certain way while another desire
motivates her not to act in that way. When two desires conflict, how does the Humean approach
explain why a person acts in one way rather than another? A natural way for the Humean
approach to answer this question is to claim that people act according to the following principle:
The Strength Principle1
Whenever someone tries to do φ, her desire to do φ is stronger than any conflicting
desire.
With this principle, the Humean approach provides a “hydraulic” picture of motivation in which
conflicting desires “push” a person in opposing directions with a kind of motivational “pressure,”
and stronger desires “overpower” weaker ones.2
The Humean approach is appealing because this principle makes it flexible enough to
provide a simple explanation for a variety of intentional behavior: someone tries to do φ because
her desire to φ is stronger than any conflicting desire. Social and behavioral scientists seem to
1

Advocates of the Humean approach offer different formulations of this principle such as “Agents do whatever
maximizes expected desire satisfaction” (Sinhababu 2011) or “whenever we try to do something, we want to do that
thing more than we want to do anything else we can do” (Kennett and Smith 1996). The first formulation entails
that we always act in a way that is instrumentally rational, while the second formulation entails that we never try to
watch TV and exercise at the same time if one desire is stronger than the other, unless “jointly satisfiable
contemporaneous desires agglomerate” (Mele 1998). My formulation of the Strength Principle is compatible with
these commitments, but does not rely on them.
2
The hydraulic metaphor originates in McDowell (1981).
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rely on this principle when they use decision theory to model human and animal behavior. These
models assign a value called “utility” to various behavioral options, where a person or organism
always takes the option with the greatest utility.3 Assuming that utility measures desire strength,
advocates of the Humean approach could argue that the best explanation for the success of these
decision theoretic models is that humans and perhaps some non-human animals always act
according to the Strength Principle.
Someone might think the Strength Principle does not allow the Humean approach to
explain why people sometimes resist their desires. If I only act on the strongest of two or more
conflicting desires, then how do I intentionally resist my desire to eat something delicious but
unhealthy, to waste money on unnecessary purchases, to stay in bed, or to stop working on my
paper? An advocate of the Humean approach could account for at least some cases of in which
someone resists a desire. In order to explain how, I need to clarify what it means to “resist” a
desire.
Mele (1990, p. 459) defines resisting a desire in the following way: “[a]n agent’s attempt
to resist a desire is an attempt to manipulate his motivational condition, his environment, or both
in such a way as to bring it about that he does not act on the desire being resisted.” By
“motivational condition,” I believe Mele means the facts about someone’s mental state that affect
what she has motivation to do, including all of the facts about someone’s desires and their
relative strengths.
Mele discusses two ways of resisting a desire: “skilled strategies” and “brute resistance.”
Skilled strategies include rearranging one’s environment in order to make oneself unable to act
on a desire at a later time, avoiding tempting stimuli that cause the strength of a desire to
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Sometimes the Strength Principle is formulated in terms of decision theory, such as in Sinhababu (2011).
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increase, and performing mental exercises, such as imagining the object of a desire as something
undesirable.
However, there are some cases in which a person cannot resist a desire with one of these
strategies, because she is not aware of an effective strategy for the situation. Even so, someone
might still be able to resist a desire with what Mele calls “brute resistance,” which involves
resisting a desire with “sheer effort of will,” what we ordinarily call “willpower.” When
someone tries to resist a desire by exercising willpower, she makes a direct, mental effort to
control the strengths of her desires. For instance, exercising willpower to resist my desire to stay
in bed would involve making a direct, mental effort to weaken my desire to stay in bed.
However, examples like this are problematic for the Humean approach. According to the
Strength Principle, I would not do anything to try to get myself up unless my desire to get up
were stronger than any conflicting desire. But if my desire to get up were stronger than my
desire to stay in bed, then I could get up without trying to resist the latter desire. If people
always act according the Strength Principle, then do they ever try to do anything that involves
resisting a desire?
Kennett and Smith (1996) argue that the Strength Principle is compatible with resisting a
desire in cases of “diachronic” self-control in which one does something at an earlier time in
order to prevent oneself from acting on a desire at a later time. Diachronic self-control is
consistent with the Strength Principle because I can intentionally do something to resist a desire
before it becomes stronger than any conflicting desire.
For instance, placing my alarm across the room before I go to bed is an example of
diachronic self-control. I place my alarm across the room because I anticipate that when I wake
up the next morning, my desire to stay in bed will be stronger than my desire to get up unless I
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cannot silence my alarm without getting up and walking across the room. The Humean approach
can explain why I place my alarm across the room as long as, before I go to bed, my desire to get
up early is stronger than my current desire to sleep in. Resisting the desire to sleep in is
consistent with the Strength Principle because my desire to get up is stronger when I place my
alarm across the room.
Sometimes, however, people cannot anticipate changes in their desires far enough in
advance to change their environment accordingly. Can we still try to prevent ourselves from
acting in a certain way by using some kind of mental effort or “willpower” to control the
strengths of our desires? The Strength Principle does allow the Humean approach to explain
some cases in which people control their desires with willpower. As I am grading papers, for
instance, my desire to stop grading gradually becomes stronger. Exercising willpower to prevent
this desire from becoming stronger than my desire to continue grading is compatible with the
Strength Principle as long as my desire to continue is still stronger than my desire to stop.
Therefore, I could resist my desire to stop grading by exercising willpower before the desire to
stop exceeds the strength of the desire to continue.
Perhaps the Strength Principle is compatible with diachronic self-control, but trying to
weaken the desire to stay in bed when one is currently lying in bed would be an example of what
Kennett and Smith call “synchronic” self-control, in which one does something to stop oneself
from acting on a desire in the immediate present.
Synchronic self-control presents a difficulty for the Humean approach: if I am
intentionally lying in bed, then my desire to lie in bed is stronger than any conflicting desire,
including my desire to get up. However, I would not try to resist my desire to stay in bed unless
some conflicting desire, such as the desire to get up, were stronger than the desire to lie in bed.
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Therefore, if I am intentionally lying in bed, then I will not, at the same time, try to exercise
willpower or do anything else in order to stop myself from lying in bed. In general, I never
intentionally do anything to exercise synchronic self-control.
This consequence of the Strength Principle is a problem for the Humean approach
because synchronic self-control seems very common. For instance, most people would claim to
have experience of resisting the desire to stay in bed. Do these cases violate the Strength
Principle?
Jeanette Kennett and Michael Smith (1996) discuss a way for people to exercise
synchronic self-control without violating the Strength Principle: sometimes we do exercise
synchronic self-control, but not by trying to do anything or by doing anything intentionally. In
their words, synchronic self-control is “non-actional,” where an action is something that
someone does intentionally–something one tries to do.
Not everything people do is intentional. For instance, people have many thoughts and
other mental processes without trying to have them, because these thoughts and processes occur
spontaneously and automatically. Kennett and Smith argue that some of these thoughts and
processes affect desires.
For instance, thoughts about deadlines might strengthen the desire to get out of bed.4 If I
have a disposition to have these thoughts when I wake up in the morning, then these thoughts can
cause my desire to get up to become stronger than my desire to stay in bed. Having these
thoughts could be a way of exercising synchronic self-control.
Since I can have these thoughts without trying to have them, the Strength Principle does
not require that my desire to get up is stronger than any conflicting desire to explain how I
exercise self-control, change the strengths of my desires, and get up. Instead, my disposition to
4

Again, Kennett and Smith make the same kind of argument using a different example.
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have these thoughts explains how my desire to get up becomes strong enough to overcome my
desire to stay in bed. Since exercising synchronic self-control in this way would not violate the
Strength Principle, the Humean approach can allow for synchronic self-control as long as one
does not exercise synchronic self-control intentionally.
However, this explanation of synchronic self-control is not consistent with many of our
experiences of resisting desires, such as the desire to stay in bed. The experience of resisting the
desire to stay in bed often seems to involve a feeling of effort, suggesting that resisting this
desire is something I try to do. Perhaps this experience is an illusion and I am not intentionally
trying to exercise willpower, but in the next section I present some experimental results
suggesting that people do intentionally try to resist a desire when they exercise synchronic selfcontrol.

2.2

What does Humean Approach entail for Fatigue Generality?

Since the Humean approach puts certain constraints on how we exercise self-control,
perhaps this approach makes predictions that can be tested by studies like those in Chapter 1.
Recall the phenomenon of Fatigue Generality, in which performing one task weakens
performance on a second task, even if these tasks have nothing in common other than selfcontrol or executive control. For some of these tasks, like the puzzle, handgrip, and cold pressor,
performance depends on resisting a desire, like the desire to give up on the puzzle, the desire to
release the handgrip, or the desire to pull one’s arm out of the cold water.
There is a simpler way and a more complicated way for the Humean approach to explain
why performing an executive control task makes people perform worse on these self-control
tasks. The simpler way has a couple of problems: it is committed to the Motivation Only
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Explanation from Chapter 1, and it cannot account for the feeling of effort involved exercising
self-control. The more complicated way for the Humean approach to account for Fatigue
Generality avoids both of these problems: it is committed to the Difficulty Explanation from
Chapter 1, and it does account for the feeling of effort involved in self-control.
Because of the Humean approach’s commitment about synchronic self-control, however,
I argue that this second way of accounting for Fatigue Generality predicts that tasks involving
synchronic self-control are exceptions to Fatigue Generality. In other words, performing an
executive control task should not affect performance on tasks requiring synchronic self-control.
Since this prediction is testable, I mention some studies with tasks requiring synchronic selfcontrol. These studies disconfirm the prediction of the Humean approach, so I argue that they
provide evidence against this approach.
The simpler way for the Humean approach to account for Fatigue Generality is that
performing an executive control task weakens some desires relative to others. Consider the cold
pressor task, in which the participants must hold an arm under painfully cold water for as long as
they can. Perhaps fatigue weakens certain desires, like the desire to satisfy an obligation to the
experimenter or the desire to perform well on the task. Suppose a participant continues to hold
her arm in the cold water because of a desire to perform well on the task. If the desire to relieve
pain continuously gets stronger while her arm remains in the water, then, for people suffering
from this kind of fatigue, this desire would not take as much time to become stronger than the
desire to perform well. According to the Strength Principle, people pull out of the cold water
when the desire to relieve the pain becomes stronger than any conflicting desire, which would
happen sooner for people with a weaker desire to perform well on the task. If the fatigue of ego-
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depletion weakens the desire to perform well, then people suffering from ego-depletion should
pull out of the cold water sooner than people who are not suffering from ego-depletion.
There are two problems with this way of accounting for Fatigue Generality. The first
problem is that accounting for Fatigue Generality in terms of changes in the relative strengths of
people’s desires entails the Motivation Only Explanation from Chapter 1. Weakening some
desires relative to others reduces motivation to perform well on the second task. Recall from
Chapter 1 that the Motivation Only Explanation claims that performing one executive control
task reduces motivation to perform well on a second executive control task, which causes people
not to try as hard on the second task.
In Chapter 1, I argued that experimental results from Vohs, Baumeister, and Schmeichel
(2012) provide evidence against Motivation Only Explanation. The Motivation Only
Explanation predicts that motivational incentives should cause some improvement on task
performance for any level of ego-depletion, but Vohs, Baumeister, and Schmeichel found that
motivational incentives only have this effect for milder levels of depletion, and that this effect
disappears for severe levels of depletion. These results disconfirm the prediction of the
Motivation Only Explanation, which is a problem for accounting for Fatigue Generality only in
terms of changes in relative desire strengths.
The second problem for the simpler way of accounting for Fatigue Generality is one
aspect of the phenomenology of self-control: the feeling of effort involved in acting contrary to
some desires but not others. Intuitively, acting contrary to stronger desires should involve a
greater feeling of effort than acting contrary to weaker desires, but an example will illustrate why
the Strength Principle is not consistent with such a straightforward relationship between the
motivational strength of a desire and this feeling of effort.
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Imagine what it feels like to hold your arm in the tank of ice water. At first, the cold
water would feel unpleasant, but keeping your arm in the tank should not require much effort.
As the cold water begins to hurt, continuing to hold your arm in the tank should require more and
more effort until you pull it out. Unlike holding your arm in the water, pulling it out of the water
is easy and lacks the same feeling of effort.
This example suggests that, if the Strength Principle is correct, then the motivational
strength of a desire does not determine the intensity of this feeling of effort. According to the
Strength Principle, you hold your arm under the ice water as long as the desire to continue is
stronger than the desire to remove your arm, and you remove your arm when the desire to
remove your arm becomes stronger than the desire to continue. Therefore, holding your arm in
the ice water is difficult even when the desire to continue is stronger than the desire to remove
your arm. When the desire to relieve the pain becomes stronger than the desire to perform well,
pulling your arm out is easy. The strengths of these desires do not explain why continuing feels
difficult or why stopping feels easy.
Fortunately for the Humean approach, there is a more complicated way of accounting for
Fatigue Generality that is not committed to the Motivation Only Explanation and can also
account for the feeling of effort involved in self-control. Recall from Section 2.1 that the
Humean approach can explain why people would intentionally exercise willpower in order to
resist their desires in cases of diachronic self-control. For instance, someone could intentionally
exercise willpower to resist her desire to remove her arm if she begins to exercise willpower
before this desire becomes stronger than the desire to perform well. As long as the desire to
perform well is stronger, then intentionally trying to resist the desire to remove her arm does not
violate the Strength Principle.
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If ego-depletion weakens the effectiveness of willpower, then the Humean approach
could explain why people suffering from ego-depletion pull out of the cold water twice as soon.
Perhaps when participants put one arm into the tank, the desire to perform well on the task is
stronger than the desire to relieve the pain. As the pain increases, so does the desire to relieve
the pain. Perhaps participants are aware of the increasing strength of this desire, and, since the
desire to perform well on the task is still stronger than the desire to relieve the pain, they
intentionally exercise willpower to resist the desire to relieve the pain. If willpower is less
effective for participants suffering from ego-depletion, then they will not be able to resist the
desire to relieve the pain as well as those who are not suffering from ego-depletion, and the
desire to relieve the pain will become stronger than the desire to perform well more quickly than
if willpower were more effective.
This way of accounting for Fatigue Generality is not committed to the Motivation Only
Explanation. Accounting for Fatigue Generality in terms of an impaired capacity for willpower
is more consistent with the Difficulty Explanation, because the impaired capacity for willpower
makes certain desires more difficult to resist.
Accounting for Fatigue Generality in terms of the difficulty of controlling one’s desires
also provides a way to explain why holding one’s arm in the water is difficult while pulling out is
not. Perhaps holding an arm in the cold water involves a greater feeling of effort because
holding one’s arm in the water requires intentionally controlling the strength of one’s desires,
whereas pulling out of the ice water does not. The feeling of effort comes from intentionally
controlling one’s desires.
While this more complicated way of accounting for Fatigue Generality allows the
Humean approach to avoid the two problems raised by the simpler way of accounting for Fatigue
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Generality, the more complicated way suffers from a different problem: because of the Humean
approach’s commitments about synchronic self-control mentioned in Section 2.1, this more
complicated way of accounting for Fatigue Generality makes a testable prediction: tasks
requiring synchronic self-control should be exceptions to Fatigue Generality. In other words,
performing an executive control task should not affect a second task requiring synchronic selfcontrol.
Recall from Section 2.1 that the Humean approach is committed to claiming that we
never intentionally exercise synchronic self-control. Instead, we can only exercise synchronic
self-control by unintentionally having thoughts or other mental processes that affect our desires.
Since we must have these thoughts or other processes without trying to have them, they must
occur automatically and effortlessly, which means they should not involve executive control the
way intentionally exercising willpower in order to resist a desire does.
Recall from Chapter 1 that ego-depletion only effects mental capacities involving
executive control, and these capacities are effortful and voluntary. For instance, complex
reasoning is more effortful and voluntary than recalling words and facts, and one study
mentioned in Chapter 1 found that ego-depletion impairs complex reasoning more than recalling
words and facts (Schmeichel et al., 2003). Ego-depletion affects willpower because willpower
involves executive control. It is a kind of mental effort that people exercise voluntarily.
The Humean approach predicts that tasks requiring synchronic self-control are not
affected by ego-depletion because the Humean approach is committed to explaining synchronic
self-control only with thoughts and mental processes that occur automatically and effortlessly.
Since thoughts and mental processes that occur automatically and effortlessly do not involve
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executive control, they should not be affected by ego-depletion. Therefore, ego-depletion should
not affect synchronic self-control.
However, I argue that some studies disconfirm this prediction. In these studies,
experimenters measure performance on tasks that seem to require synchronic self-control, and
ego-depletion does affect performance on these tasks. For instance, Vohs and Heatherton (2000)
recruited female college students who scored highly on a scale indicating that they were chronic
dieters. Participants began with the video task described in Chapter 1, with one group of
participants suppressing their emotional responses and the other groups allowing themselves to
react naturally to the video. After the video task, experimenters would present the participant
with three large containers of ice cream, and ask the participant to taste and rate the three
different flavors. Before leaving the room, the experimenter would tell the participant to “help
yourself to any ice cream you want; we have tons in the freezer.”
On the ice cream task, self-control is measured in the quantity of ice cream that
participants scoop into their bowls to eat. Resisting the desire for more ice cream would be an
example of synchronic self-control because, if the participant has already begun scooping, she
must resist the desire for more ice-cream while she is intentionally scooping more ice cream.
While she is intentionally scooping more ice cream, the Strength Principle entails that her desire
for more ice cream is stronger than any conflicting desire. As long as her desire for more ice
cream is stronger than any conflicting desire, the Strength Principle requires that she will not
intentionally do anything in order to resist this desire. The only way she could resist this desire
is by having thoughts or other mental processes that occur non-intentionally and weaken this
desire or strengthen some conflicting desire. For a chronic dieter, thoughts about physical
health, for instance, might strengthen the desire to avoid gaining weight. But ego-depletion
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would not prevent these thoughts or any other mental process that occurs automatically and
effortlessly, because ego-depletion only affects mental processes involving executive control.
Since resisting the desire for more ice cream is an example of synchronic self-control, the
Humean approach predicts that ego-depletion should not affect how much ice cream people
scoop into their bowls.
In fact, participants who tried to suppress their emotions on the video task ate
significantly more ice cream than participants who did not try to suppress their emotions,
confirming that ego-depletion impaired the ability to resist the desire for more ice cream. Since
the Humean approach predicts that ego-depletion does not affect synchronic self-control, these
results are not consistent with this approach. On the other hand, these results are quite consistent
with the possibility that, while intentionally scooping more ice cream, people also intentionally
exercise willpower in order to try to resist the desire for more ice cream.
Advocates of the Humean approach might try to defend the Strength Principle by arguing
that the ice cream task is really an example of diachronic self-control. Suppose that when
someone begins scooping ice cream, she desires two scoops of ice cream more than she desires
to avoid consuming fat and sugar, but she desires to avoid consuming fat and sugar more than
three scoops of ice cream. As she continues scooping, her desire for a third scoop starts getting
stronger. Intentionally trying to resist the desire for a third scoop would not violate the Strength
Principle as long as she begins trying to resist before this desire becomes stronger than any
conflicting desire. In other words, resisting the desire for a third scoop is diachronic self-control.
If people suffering from ego-depletion cannot control the strength of this desire as
effectively as people who are not suffering from ego-depletion, then ego-depletion increases the
chance that the desire for a third scoop will eventually become stronger than the desire to avoid
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consuming fat and sugar. If the ice cream task really involves diachronic self-control, then the
Humean approach can provide an explanation for why ego-depletion causes chronic dieters to
scoop more ice cream.
If the ice cream task involves diachronic self-control, then the Humean approach can
explain any feeling of effort that participants experience on the ice cream task. Perhaps they
experience a feeling of effort that comes from intentionally trying to control the strength of the
desire for a third scoop.
The problem with this explanation of the feeling of effort is that not all effortful cases of
synchronic self-control can be redescribed as diachronic self-control. There are some cases of
resisting a desire, such as resisting the desire to stay in bed, that must involve genuine synchronic
self-control, and these cases do involve the feeling of effort. If I am intentionally lying in bed,
then the Strength Principle requires that my desire to lie in bed is stronger than any conflicting
desire. Sometimes I get out of bed by resisting this desire, but the Humean approach requires
that I can only resist this desire by non-intentionally having some thoughts or mental processes
that affect the strengths of my desires. However, if I have these thoughts or processes occur
automatically and effortlessly, then why does resisting my desire to stay in bed feel so effortful?
The Humean approach can explain the feeling of effort involved in diachronic selfcontrol, because this approach can explain why people would intentionally try to control their
desires to stay in the cold water and why they do not need to control their desires to pull out of
the cold water. A similar explanation is not available for the feeling of effort involved in
synchronic self-control, because the Humean approach requires that synchronic self-control
involves mental processes that occur automatically and effortlessly.
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I suppose advocates of the Humean approach could argue that certain thoughts and
mental processes involve a feeling of effort even though they occur automatically and without
any actual effort. However, these advocates of the Humean approach would need to explain why
these thoughts and mental processes involve a feeling of effort when there is no actual effort,
while other thoughts and mental processes do not. Some thoughts, like thoughts about how little
sleep one got the night before, should strengthen the desire to stay in bed. Having these thoughts
does not seem to involve this feeling of effort. Advocates of the Humean approach would need
to explain why certain thoughts and mental processes involve a feeling of effort while others do
not.

2.3

Conclusion

To explain why we try to act one way rather than another, the Humean approach relies on
the Strength Principle, which says we act according to the stronger of two or more conflicting
desires. This principle allows the Humean approach to explain why people intentionally try to
resist a desire in cases of diachronic self-control, but not for synchronic self-control. For
synchronic self-control, the Humean approach requires that people resist their desires by nonintentionally having certain thoughts and mental process that affect the strengths of their desires.
However, experimental results suggest that ego-depletion only affects mental processes
that people intentionally try to carry out, so the Humean approach predicts that ego-depletion
would not affect synchronic self-control. Some studies, however, include tasks that seem to
require synchronic but not diachronic self-control, and ego-depletion does affect performance on
these tasks, which contradicts the prediction of the Humean approach. The Humean approach
also cannot explain the feeling of effort involved in synchronic self-control.
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Since these problems are consequences of the Strength Principle, I argue that we should
abandon this principle. If people can act in ways that violate the Strength Principle, then what
are the consequences for action theory? One consequence is that one can intentionally act
contrary to a stronger desire. Exercising willpower might be an example of such an action. One
might intentionally try to resist a desire to stay in bed even though this desire is stronger than the
desire to get up.5
The strength of a desire is a measure of how much that desire influences various actions.
The Strength Principle requires that all desires have strengths that are measurable on one
common scale, so the strongest relevant desire always determines what a person does. Since
there is only one measure of influence, the same desire cannot influence different actions in
different amounts. Denying the Strength Principle eliminates this restriction, allowing one desire
to have greater influence over one action than another desire, but less of an influence on some
other action than that same other desire. For instance, the desire to get up may have a weaker
influence on whether I get up than my desire to stay in bed, but the former desire may have a
stronger influence on whether I exercise willpower. Denying the Strength Principle allows
people to try to act in two conflicting ways at the same time, which is an interesting possibility
for action theory.

5

Mele (1997) discusses this possibility in detail while arguing against the Strength Principle.
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3

SELF-CONTROL FAILURE:

WHY IT’S NOT (COMPLETELY) MY FAULT
People have strong desires to do what they know they should not do, from sleeping in
when they know they should get up to relapsing with alcohol or addictive drugs. Sometimes we
resist these desires by exercising willpower. Sometimes we try to exercise willpower but still
fail to resist anyway. Self-control failure raises an important philosophical question: is someone
fully responsible for doing something wrong if she tried to resist the desire to do so?
In Chapter 1, I argued that ego-depletion makes self-control more difficult. In this
chapter, I will argue that people suffering from ego-depletion are not fully responsible for
failures of self-control.
Suppose a recovering addict revisits his former heroin den intending to leave as quickly
as possible without using heroin, but upon arrival he encounters sights, sounds and smells that
vividly remind him of the way it feels to get high, eliciting a strong craving for heroin. If he tries
very hard to avoid acting on this desire but ultimately fails to resist, is he fully responsible for
relapsing?
Someone might argue that our recovering addict is responsible for relapsing because his
addictive cravings are a consequence of a series of choices earlier in his life, or because these
cravings are a consequence of his choice to put himself in a situation that would elicit these
cravings. But perhaps he is not fully responsible for becoming an addict because he was not an
adult at the time, and maybe he is not fully responsible for revisiting the heroin den because
someone takes him there by force to repay a remaining debt. If so, then responsibility for
relapsing, or at least full responsibility, would not trace back to becoming an addict or to
revisiting the heroin den. Furthermore, perhaps he was not able to foresee the consequence of
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relapse, because he lacked access to relevant information about heroin addiction before
becoming addicted, or because he had good reason to believe he would not encounter certain
temptations at the heroin den. We might think responsibility only traces back to something one
did at an earlier time if one was to some extent able to foresee the consequences at that time. If
full responsibility for relapsing does not completely trace back to becoming an addict or to
revisiting the heroin den, then we are left with the same question as before: if he tries very hard
to resist the desire for heroin, is he fully responsible for failing to resist this desire?
Relapsing at the heroin den is an example of self-control failure. I use the term “selfcontrol failure” for situations in which a person tries to resist a desire and fails, such as when the
recovering addict tries but fails to resist his desire for heroin. When he encounters the stimuli
that elicit a strong craving for heroin, the recovering addict attempts to exercise willpower in
order to resist. Heroin cravings are notoriously difficult to resist with sheer effort, which is why
the recovering addict ultimately fails to resist in spite of trying very hard.
Is the fact that the recovering addict failed to resist even though he tried very tried
relevant in any way to the question of whether he is fully responsible for relapsing? The reason
why this question is so important to consider is that someone who lacks full responsibility for the
way she acts deserves to be treated more leniently than someone who is fully responsible. Some
circumstances, known as “excusing conditions,” make a person less responsible for the way she
acts than she would be in other circumstances. If two college students are late for an exam, one
because of sleeping in and the other because of a sprained ankle on the way to class that slows
her down, then the second deserves more leniency than the first.
One reason to excuse someone for acting or failing to act in a certain way is that this
person was not able to act differently. Philosophical, legal, and common, everyday discourse
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take for granted that moral responsibility depends on what a person is able to do. If someone is
not able to prevent something bad from happening, for instance, then she is not morally
responsible for it. Suppose an innocent person will die from a poisonous snakebite, and the only
way to save him is to run a long distance in a short amount of time to retrieve the antidote. You
try to retrieve the antidote in time, but fail because you cannot run fast or far enough. Since you
failed to save his life because you were not able to do otherwise, you are not responsible for his
death. Our lack of responsibility in cases like this one follows from the following principle:
Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP)6
A person is not morally responsible for what she has done if she did it because she could
not have done otherwise.
This principle links moral responsibility to what a person is able to do, and what it takes to be
able to do something is disputed by libertarians and compatibilists in the free will debate. Since I
want the arguments in this chapter to persuade both libertarians and compatibilists, I will avoid
relying on either conception of free will.
While libertarians and compatibilists disagree about what it takes to be able to do
something, they can agree about certain things one cannot do in certain cases. In the example I
just gave, for instance, libertarians and compatibilists can agree that you are not able to save a
person’s life. The ability to save his life depends not just on whether determinism is true and
whether free will is compatible with determinism, but also on your physical capacities to run fast
and far enough. Even if libertarians and compatibilists do not agree about determinism and free
will, they can still agree that your body’s physical limitations prevent you from retrieving the
antidote in time.
Libertarians and compatibilists can also agree about cases in which one cannot do
something because of mental, rather than physical, limitations. Suppose retrieving the antidote
6

This principle first received this name in (Frankfurt 1969).
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requires a secret code. You know a complex algorithm for breaking the code, but performing
this algorithm requires difficult mental arithmetic. You try to break the code, but you are not
good enough at mental arithmetic to carry out the algorithm in time. Again, even if libertarians
and compatibilists do not agree about determinism and free will, they can still agree that your
cognitive limitations prevent you from retrieving the antidote in time. For both of these
examples, the Principle of Alternate Possibilities entails you are not responsible for failing to
save someone’s life, regardless of whether determinism is true or whether free will is compatible
with determinism.
Does this principle also apply to cases of self-control failure, in which someone tries but
fails to resist a strong desire? Consider a similar case of an innocent person who will die from
poisoning, but getting to the antidote requires crossing a shallow stream, and you have a severe
phobia of running water due to a traumatic experience in your childhood. Regardless, you run to
the water’s edge and attempt to put your right foot into the stream, only to recoil in fear. After a
few minutes of repeatedly trying to step into the water and recoiling in fear each time, he dies.
Are you morally responsible failing to save him? If your desire not to step in the water actually
made you unable to cross the stream, then the Principle of Alternate Possibilities entails that you
are not morally responsible for his death.
This example assumes that you are not able to resist your desire to step into the stream.
Are there any real cases of such irresistible desires? If we need certain capacities like willpower
in order to resist certain desires, and if these capacities have limitations just like physical speed
and endurance, and mental arithmetic, then perhaps the limitations of willpower make some
desires irresistible. In Chapter I, I discussed a growing body of experimental results confirming
that willpower is subject to such limitations. Exercising willpower depends on limited
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physiological resources, and depleting these resources impairs willpower, making some desires
more difficult to resist.
If willpower is limited in this way, it may follow that depleting these physiological
resources enough can actually make a person unable to resist certain desires. Let’s call this
claim the “Inability Hypothesis:”
Inability Hypothesis
Some cases of ego-depletion are so severe that someone acts the way she does because
she is not able to do otherwise.
For instance, if our recovering heroin addict resists the desire for heroin by exercising willpower,
he will deplete some of the physiological resources on which willpower depends. The longer he
exercises willpower, the more of these resources he will deplete. The Inability Hypothesis
claims that it is possible for him to become so depleted that he is no longer able to continue
resisting this desire. If this desire really is irresistible, then the Principle of Alternate
Possibilities entails that he is not responsible for failing to resist. The Inability Hypothesis and
Principle of Alternate Possibilities together entail that there are severe cases of ego-depletion in
which people are not responsible for failures of self-control. If both the Inability Hypothesis and
the Principle of Alternate Possibilities are true, then severe ego-depletion constitutes an excusing
condition.
However, there are a couple of problems with this argument. First, the Inability
Hypothesis is an empirical claim which could turn out to be false. In fact, denying the Inability
Hypothesis is not, strictly speaking, inconsistent with the strength model or the experimental
results discussed in Chapter I. Perhaps ego-depletion makes certain desires more difficult to
resist, but there is no point at which a person becomes completely unable to resist that desire.
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Ego-depletion could make a desire more difficult to resist even though a person could always
resist this desire simply by trying harder.
In general, perhaps a person could always resist by trying hard enough regardless of how
difficult some desire is to resist. Joel Feinberg illustrates this possibility by comparing it to a
couple of colorful examples:
[S]trictly speaking, no impulse is “irresistible.” For every case of giving in to a desire, I
would argue, it will be truth that, if a person had tried harder, he would have resisted it
successfully. The psychological situation is never–or hardly ever–like that of a man who
hangs from a windowsill by his fingernails until the sheer physical force of gravity rips
his nails off and sends him plummeting to the ground, or like that of the man who dives
from a sinking ship in the middle of the ocean and swims until he is exhausted and then
drowns. Human endurance puts a severe limitation on how long one can stay afloat in
the ocean; but there is no comparable limit to our ability to resist temptation (Feinberg,
1970, pp. 282-283).
Feinberg seems to claim that there is an interesting difference between the psychological
capacity of resisting desires and other capacities like physical strength and endurance: we can
always successfully resist a desire by trying hard enough even though there are some physical
challenges that we cannot overcome no matter how hard we try. One wonders why a resisting
would be different from our physical capacities in this way.
Some examples, however, will suggest that Feinberg’s claim is quite plausible, and that
the Inability Hypothesis may not be so plausible. One way to get someone to try harder is to
motivate that person with incentives. The recovering addict would most likely resist the desire
for heroin if commanded at gunpoint not to use heroin. He would also most likely resist for a
large enough monetary reward. If a great enough incentive would get someone to try hard
enough to successfully resist a desire, then someone could argued that this person is able to
resist. Even if the recovering addict were suffering from a very severe case of ego-depletion, he
would probably still avoid using heroine if threatened at gun point.
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One reply to this argument would be to deny the claim that, if a strong enough incentive
would get someone to act in a certain way, then that person is able to act in that way even
without that incentive. Sometimes an incentive can actually change what someone is able to do.
For instance, Al Mele offers the example of:
...the woman who, under ordinary circumstances, cannot even budge a 300 pound weight,
but who, upon finding her child pinned under a 400 pound timber manages, due to a
sudden burst of adrenalin, to raise the timber from his body. Surely, it would be
misleading to say that she can lift 400 pounds, if we leave it at that. Rather, we should
say that in ordinary circumstances she cannot do this (no matter how hard she tries),
although in a certain kind of exceptional circumstance she can (Mele 1990).
The incentive of saving her child causes the woman to successfully lift the 400 pound timber,
which does not imply that she would be able to lift the 400 pound timber even without this
incentive. The incentive changes what she is able to do. Similarly, someone could argue that
having a strong enough incentive not to use heroin changes what the recovering addict is able to
do.
The incentive of a threat to this woman’s child causes a physiological change that
actually makes her strong enough to do something she normally is not physically strong enough
to do. Perhaps the adrenalin rush of being threatened at gunpoint would provide the recovering
addict with the physiological resources, and thus the willpower, to resist a desire he otherwise
would not be able to resist. The fact that threatening him at gun point would get him to resist
does not show that he is really able resist without such a threat.
One way to avoid this problem would be to focus on the example of monetary incentives
rather than immediate, visible threats such as being threatened at gun point or having one’s child
trapped under a log. In addition to providing extra motivation to do something, these powerful
negative incentives have the side effect of changing a person’s physiological state in a way that
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enhances what that person is actually able to do, whereas the monetary incentives might not have
this side effect to the same extent.
Focusing on monetary incentives also reveals the reason for why incentives are relevant
to what that person is able to do. The reason why the recovering addict would resist the desire
for heroin for a large enough monetary incentive is that this incentive motivates him to try harder
to resist. What the incentive objection shows is that the recovering addict could try harder to
resist his desire, regardless of how severely depleted he is. If he would successfully resist this
desire by trying hard enough, then he is able to resist.
However, this objection still overlooks another important possibility: Are there cases of
depletion that are severe enough or cases of desires that are strong enough to overcome the effect
of any possible incentive a person could have? A familiar example is the pain box from the
classic sci-fi novel Dune. The protagonist Paul puts his hand inside of a box which causes a
gradually increasing feeling of pain. If he removes his hand from the box too early, he will be
killed by a poison tipped needle. While Paul does not remove his hand from the box until he
passes the test, we can imagine the pain reaching an intensity for which no one would continue to
resist the desire to remove his or her hand, even to avoid death, let alone for any amount of
money.
To consider a real life example, almost everyone cracks under torture, which is
unsurprising in light of ego-depletion. Torture victims are often deprived of sleep and food, and
tortured repeatedly, which should deplete the physiological resources upon which willpower
depends and prevent one from restoring these resources. If there is some possible torture of
great enough severity and duration that we would not withhold the information sought even for a
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later monetary reward no matter how large, then the incentive objection does not show that the
Inability Hypothesis is false.
However, even if the Inability hypothesis is correct, cases of ego-depletion severe enough
to entail a total lack of responsibility for self-control failure would be too rare for my argument
to apply to ordinary cases of self-control failure in daily life. However, I want to argue that egodepletion also affects how we should view our own common failures of self-control.
Since most cases of ego-depletion are not severe enough to satisfy PAP, perhaps there is
a similar principle about moral responsibility that is less demanding than the Principle of
Alternate Possibilities. If responsibility comes in degrees, then perhaps degrees of responsibility
depend not just on whether one is able to do otherwise or not, but also on how much one’s
capacity to do otherwise is impaired:
Capacities Principle
If someone acts the way she does partly because of an impaired capacity, then she is less
responsible for the way she acts than if that capacity were not impaired.
This principle is consistent with our intuitions about responsibility. Suppose a college student is
late for an exam because she sprains her ankle on the way to class and limps the rest of the way
there. With greater effort and pain, she could continue at her normal pace and arrive at the exam
on time. Because her capacity for walking at a normal pace is impaired, continuing at her
normal pace requires more effort than before her injury, so she slows down and hobbles the rest
of the way to the classroom, arriving 15 minutes late.
Getting to class on time requires much more effort for her than it is for everyone else,
which is why it would be unfair to hold her fully responsible for arriving late. Holding her fully
responsible would be to hold her to a higher and more severe standard than everyone else,
because arriving in time would not require nearly as much effort or pain for them.
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On the other hand, if the student arrived 15 minutes late because she slept in, then, other
things equal, it would not be unfair to hold her fully responsible. Everyone else had to wake up
by a certain time to make it to the exam, and presumably waking up requires comparable effort
for them. The Capacities Principle is quite consistent with the way we attribute responsibility to
people in particular cases, and we rely on this principle frequently in everyday life.
However, the Capacities Principle has an important consequence about responsibility for
self-control failure: If the Strength Model is correct about the limits of willpower, then people
suffering from ego-depletion are not as responsible as they would be without suffering from egodepletion. Recall from Chapter 1 that the Strength Model is committed to a particular
explanation for the effects of ego-depletion: the Difficulty Explanation, according to which
people suffering from ego-depletion have impaired mental capacities, which makes it more
difficult to do anything that requires these capacities. Willpower is one of the capacities that
becomes impaired, and willpower is necessary for resisting certain desires. Therefore, egodepletion makes these desires require more effort to resist.
If someone fails to resist a desire at least partly because of an impaired capacity for
willpower, then Capacities Principle entails that she is not as responsible for failing to resist this
desire as she would be if she were not suffering from ego-depletion. In other words, egodepletion makes people less than fully responsible for self-control failure.
For our recovering addict, resisting the desire for heroin over some period of time would
continuously deplete the physiological resources that willpower depends on, which impairs
willpower. If he eventually fails to continue resisting at least partly because of impaired
willpower, then he is less responsible than he would be if he decided to shoot up even though he
were not suffering from ego-depletion at all. If he decided to shoot up without trying to resist at
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all, or before even arriving at the heroin den, then he might still be fully responsible. This
disadvantage of suffering from ego-depletion takes some of this responsibility away, even if,
strictly speaking, he could have continued to resist if he had tried even harder.
In this chapter, I raised the question of whether we are fully responsible for failures of
self-control, and argued that we are not fully responsible when self-control failure occurs at least
partly because of ego-depletion. One reason that ego-depletion could make us less responsible
would be if we were completely unable to avoid self-control failure. However, it is not known if
ego-depletion can be severe enough to make us completely unable to avoid self-control failure.
Even if there is such a severe level of ego-depletion, most people do not reach this level of egodepletion very often. Therefore, people suffering from ego-depletion do not satisfy PAP very
often, if at all.
To argue that ego-depletion makes people less responsible for common, everyday failures
of self-control, I introduced the Capacities Principle, and argued that we do rely on this principle
for determining how much responsibility people have in various cases. If ego-depletion makes
self-control more difficult, then this principle entails that people are less responsible for selfcontrol failure than if they were not suffering from ego-depletion.
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4

PHILOSOPHICAL CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE PROJECTS

In the preceding chapters, I argued that the Strength Model has two important
philosophical implications: First, the Humean approach to motivation is incorrect about the claim
that we only act on the strongest of two or more conflicting desires. Second, people suffering
from ego-depletion are less than fully responsible for failures of self-control.
Since neither of these claims follows unless the Strength Model is correct, I argued for
the Strength Model in Chapter 1. In Section 1.2, I argued that the Strength Model makes three
important predictions: Fatigue Generality, Reduced Prefrontal Activity, and the Physical
Substance Prediction. I offered several examples of experimental studies that confirm each of
these predictions. Unless there is some better explanation for the results of these studies, these
studies provide good evidence for the Strength Model.
The Strength Model is committed to a specific explanation for the experimental result on
willpower and executive control: Difficulty Explanation. In Section 1.2, I considered three
alternative explanations for these experimental results: the Belief Explanation, the Mood
Explanation, and the Motivation Only Explanation. Each of these alternative explanations makes
testable predictions, and I mentioned studies that disconfirm each of these predictions. Since the
Difficulty Explanation accounts for these experimental results while these other explanations do
not, it is a better explanation than these alternatives. The Strength Model does seem to provide
the best explanation for the experimental results discussed in Chapter 1, so these results provide
good evidence for the Strength Model.
In Chapter 2, I relied on this conclusion to argue against the Humean approach to
motivation. I explained why the Humean approach has a strange implication about self-control:
we never intentionally exercise synchronic self-control. Because of this commitment, I argued
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that the Humean approach predicts that tasks involving synchronic self-control should be
exceptions to Fatigue Generality. Performing an executive control task should not affect
performance on a task that requires synchronic self-control. I mentioned studies that disconfirm
this prediction. These studies, I argued, provide evidence against the Humean approach.
In Chapter 3, I relied on the Strength Model to argue that people suffering from egodepletion are not fully responsible for failures of self-control. In other words, they are not as
responsible as they would be if they were not suffering from ego-depletion. According to the
Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP), we are not responsible for something unless we could
have done otherwise. However, the Strength Model does not necessarily entail that we cannot
avoid self-control failure when suffering from ego-depletion. The Strength Model only entails
that certain capacities necessary for avoiding self-control failure are impaired. Therefore, I
proposed principle that is less demanding than PAP: the Capacities Principle, according to which
impaired capacities entails less responsibility for failing to do something. The more effort
required for someone to do something, the less we should blame or penalize them for failing to
do it. Since ego-depletion makes self-control require more effort, this principle entails that
people suffering from ego-depletion are not as responsible for self-control failure as they would
be if they were not suffering from ego-depletion.
While Chapters 2 and 3 address just two philosophical questions about willpower, the
Strength Model probably has other philosophical implications as well. If the Strength Model is
correct about the limitations of willpower, philosophers should try to determine what these
implications are. As more experimental studies produce evidence for the Strength Model,
philosophers should devote more attention to these implications.
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